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FINANCING ON CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
E. GEORGE RUDOLPH *
Building contractors commonly assign future payments under
their contracts as security for working capital loans. If the various
obligations of the contractor are secured by the undertaking of a
surety, the assignee bank is likely to come into conflict with the surety
in the event of the contractor's default, since the surety will seek these
assigned payments for reimbursement of the loss which it incurs when
it either completes the job, responds in damages or pays labor and
material claims. The surety's claim will be based either on a theory
of subrogation or on an assignment included in the bond application.
A large number of cases involving these disputes have reached ap-
pellate courts, but this volume of litigation has produced remarkably
little in the way of clear and satisfactory law' This is certainly true
for the mass of decisions taken as a whole, and it seems about equally
true for most jurisdictions considered individually. The only possible
generalization is that while the surety generally wins, assignee banks
prevail just often enough to maintain the flow of litigation.
Lawyers who are concerned with these problems must now give
consideration to the Uniform Commercial Code in those states where
it has been adopted. At the outset there is probably some question as
to whether the Code applies in these cases at all and, if so, whether
it applies with respect to both the assignee bank and the surety. So
far as the assignee bank is concerned, the assigned payments would
seem to be "contract rights" as that term is defined in the Code,' and
the assignment would therefore constitute a "security agreement" in
Code terminology.' With respect to the surety's assignment in the
bond application, the situation is not so clear. Since it is not given to
secure an extension of commercial credit, it falls outside the general
class of transactions with which the Code is principally concerned:*
* A.B. 1941, J.D. 1943, University of Michigan; Professor of Law, University of
Wyoming; Member of Wyoming State Bar.
1 Jordan, The Rights of a Surety Upon the Default of Its Contractor-Principal,
41 Ore. L. Rev. 1, 4-14 (1961).
2 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-106. Building contract payments are mentioned
in the comment to this section as an illustration of contract rights. Citations to the Code
are to the 1958 Official Text, with Comments. Hereinafter the Code will be cited as
UCC.
3 UCC § 9-105(b). The Code will apply even though the assignment is out-
right rather than for security (UCC § 9-102(1)(6)). This is only a technical distinction
since either form may be used to finance on future payments.
4 See Comments to UCC § 9 - 104, especially paragraph 3, which refers to the
field of labor and material liens as being, "far removed from ordinary commercial
financing." As will be seen the position of the contractor's surety is often closely
related to these lien claimants.
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Furthermore, it is at least arguable that it is expressly excluded.. Sec-
tion 9-104 states that the Code does not apply to "a transfer of a
contract right to an assignee who is also to do the performance under
the contract." Since the surety on a building contract customarily
has the right to complete the work on the contractor's default, the
quoted section would seem to raise a considerable question. It has
been suggested that it excludes only payments earned after default
and after the surety has taken over, and that the surety's rights to
payments earned prior to default are governed by the Code. 5
 The
Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania has
held that the assignment to a surety is governed by the Code" How-
ever, the surety did not take over the project and thus the question
raised by Section 9-104 was not considered. More recently, a lower
Pennsylvania state court likewise held that the surety's assignment
is governed by the Code.' In that case the surety did take over the
project, but the amount involved had been earned by the contractor
prior to default. The court in the latter case put considerable emphasis
on the fact that the surety, by filing a financing statement, indicated
its understanding that the Code applied.
It is interesting to note that the 1952 version of the Code included
a provision expressly covering the sort of conflict between a surety
and assignee bank with which we are concerned, This provision
would apparently have given the assignee bank priority in almost
every instance, and it was eliminated in 1953 because of the protests
of the Association of Casualty and Surety Companies .° Neither of
the cases referred to above considered this bit of history in deter-
mining the applicability of the Code. More will be said of this provi-
sion and the possible significance of its elimination later in this dis-
cussion.
Even though it is concluded that one or both of the assignments
are governed by the Code, there is a further question as to whether
filing is necessary for perfection. Section 9-302 exempts from the fil-
ing requirements, "an assignment of . . . contract rights, which does
not, alone or in conjunction with other assignments to the same
assignee, transfer a significant part of the outstanding . . . contract
rights of the assignor." If a given bank customarily finances all the
5 Spivack, Secured Transactions (Under the Uniform Commercial Code) 64
(1960). This analysis, if correct, does not treat the problem in an entirely satisfactory
manner. For example, what is the status of a final payment which consists of retained
percentages earned by both the contractor and surety?
6 United States v. Fleetwood & Co., 165 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
7 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. State Pub. Sch. Bldg. Auth., 26 Pa. D. & C.2d
717 (1961).
8 Uniform Commercial Code, 1952 Official Draft, Text and Comments, § 9-312(7).
9 Uniform Commercial Code, Changes in Text and Comments at 25 (1953 Official
Version).
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jobs of a particular contractor, this exemption would clearly be un-
available. Presumably, the same conclusion would be reached if the
same surety company wrote all of the contractor's bonds. In both of
the cases discussed above, the courts held that filing was necessary
to perfect the sureties' assignment, without considering the possible
application of the quoted provision from Section 9-302.
For the balance of this discussion, it will be assumed that both
the assignment to the bank and the assignment to the surety come
under the provisions of the Code and that filing is required for per-
fection in both cases. These conclusions, however, only serve to in-
troduce the more perplexing questions which the Code raises in this
area.
In order to consider the impact of the Code, it seems desirable
to first outline the principal features of the prior law on the subject,
and this in turn requires a short explanation of some of the usual
provisions of construction contracts and contractors' bonds. The typi-
cal contract provides for two types of payments. So-called progress
payments are generally made monthly as the work progresses and
each payment, depending upon the contract, is between eighty and
ninety-five per cent of the value of labor and materials added during
the previous month as determined by the architect. The final pay-
ment is made after the building is complete and has been accepted
by the owner and equals the difference between the contract price
and the total progress payments. Included in the final payment are
the so-called retained percentages which have, in a sense, been ac-
cumulated by paying the contractor less than one hundred per cent
of value in the progress payments. The distinction between progress
payments and retained percentages has been of considerable signifi-
cance in cases of the sort under consideration.
It is likewise necessary to pay brief attention to the more or less
standard types of contractors' bonds. In every case there will be a
bond which, in effect, secures the owner against the failure of the
contractor to complete the building and otherwise fully perform the
contract. This is called a performance bond. There may also be a
payment bond under which the surety assumes liability for the pay-
ment of labor and material claims and on which the labor and material
suppliers have a direct right of action. Although payment bonds are
sometimes used in private construction, they are, in a sense, redundant
because under the performance bond the surety will be obligated
to pay labor and material claims in order to protect the owner against
liens. On the other hand, payment bonds are commonly required by
statute for public construction in order to provide a substitute security
for the laborers and materialmen who are precluded from asserting a
lien on the public improvement. While separate payment and per-
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formance bonds are frequently written, it is about as common to
include both obligations in a single undertaking. For our purpose
this distinction is not significant.
A further more or less standard feature of these cases is that
the bond application executed by the contractor generally includes a
provision which purports to assign to the surety for indemnity all
amounts becoming payable under the contract after the contractor's
default.
In analyzing the cases, then, it is necessary to make a three-way
classification: first, on the basis of whether the amount in dispute
consists of retained percentages or earned, but unpaid, progress pay-
ments; second, on whether the contract is for private or public
construction and lastly, on whether the surety is relying upon the
assignment in the application or upon a theory of subrogation. This
is not to say that other distinctions are unimportant.
The law is most clear with respect to retained percentages. Under
any view, and regardless of whether the contract is for public or pri-
vate construction, the retained percentages serve as security to the
owner that the project will be completed. If then, the contractor fails
to complete the work in accordance with the contract, and the surety
takes over and completes performance, the surety's right to the re-
tained percentages as against the contractor's assignee is clear on the
theory of subrogation to the owner." If the surety responds in dam-
ages instead of taking over performance, its rights with respect to
the retained percentages will be basically the same. It will be entitled
to have them applied in mitigation of damages rather than paid to
the assignee bank. The subordinate position of the assignee in these
cases can be most easily explained by the well established proposition
that the rights of an assignee can be no greater than those of his
assignor."
A somewhat different analysis is necessary with respect to re-
tained percentages in cases where the contractor has completed the
construction but left labor and material bills which the surety has
been required to pay. In private construction the retainage can prop-
erly be considered security to protect the owner from the liens which
would result from such unpaid claims, and the paying surety can
therefore predicate his claim to priority over an assignee bank on
subrogation to the owner. However, since liens are not possible in
the case of public construction, no very strong argument can be made
10 Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896); Levinson v. Linder-
man, 51 Wash. 2d 855, 322 P.2d 863 (1958) ; Johnson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 225 Ark.
224, 280 S.W.2d 398 (1955).
II Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Texarkana Sch. Dist., 227 Ark. 759, 301 S.W.2d
453 (1957); American Employers Ins. Co. v. School Dist., 99 N.H. 188, 107 A.2d 684
(1954).
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for this type subrogation in such cases. Nevertheless, if the laborers
and materialmen have enforceable rights to the retained percentages,
the surety will logically prevail on the theory of subrogation to them.
This seems to be the usual result so far as state and local construction
are concerned." In New York, however, it has been recently held that
the state or other public contracting body has no right to use retained
percentages to pay labor and material claims and that the surety,
therefore, cannot prevail by subrogation to such claimants?' The
cases involving federal contracts are somewhat confusing. For some
purposes it has been held that laborers and materialmen have no
right to the retained percentages, and that therefore the surety can-
not claim such amounts on the basis of subrogation to the labor and
material suppliers it has been required to pay." But in cases of the
type now under consideration, where the dispute is between the pay-
ing surety and an assignee bank, the federal courts have consistently
held that the laborers and materialmen have a sufficient equitable or
inchoate interest in the retainage to support the surety's claim to
priority on the theory of subrogation?'
With respect to retained percentages, then, the surety has gen-
erally been able to prevail on some theory of subrogation and has not
had to rely on its assignment. There is presently nothing in the Code
which expressly denies or limits the surety's rights by subrogation.
It would therefore seem proper to conclude that the enactment of the
Code has not changed the law so far as retained percentages are con-
cerned.'" As previously mentioned, the 1952 draft of the Code in-
cluded a provision giving an assignee bank priority as to all amounts
payable under the contract, so long as the bank's advances were
12 Farmers' Bank v. Hayes, 58 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1932); United States Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. City of Montesano, 160 Wash. 565, 295 Pac. 934 (1931).
13 State Bank v. Dan-Bar Contracting Co., 23 Misc.2d 487, 199 N.Y.S.2d 309
(1960), aff'd, 12 App. Div. 2d 416, 212 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1961). This decision was clearly
influenced by New York legislation. See discussion at note 54, infra. See also DuBois
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 341 Pa. 85, 18 A.2d 802 (1941).
14 United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947) held that the federal
government could set off a separate debt owed to it by the contractor against the re-
tained percentages on a government contract as against the surety who sought such
retainage to reimburse itself for amounts paid to laborers and materialmen. Consider-
able doubts as to the scope of the Munsey Trust case are raised by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962), which held that
the surety has a better right to the retained percentages on a government contract than
the contractor's trustee in bankruptcy. According to a concurring opinion this result was
reached by the majority on the theory of subrogation to labor and material claims.
13 Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896) ; National Sur. Corp.
v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 724, 133 F. Supp. 381 (1955). See also California Bank v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 129 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1942).
la See UCC § 1-103 which preserves all general principles of law and equity unless
displaced by particular provisions of the Code. While subrogation is not expressly men-
tioned, the similar equitable doctrines of estoppel, fraud, duress and mistake are specifi-
cally included.
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designated for use in the performance of the contract'? The Associa-
tion of Casualty and Surety Companies convinced the draftsmen
that this provision was contrary to the majority view under the case
law and it was therefore eliminated.' This seems to indicate that the
draftsmen would agree with the conclusion, stated above, that the
Code does not alter the surety's priority when based on subrogation.
However, a recent decision of a Pennsylvania trial court ap-
parently holds otherwise. In Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. State
Pub. Sch. Bldg. Auth.," the surety and an assignee bank were con-
testing for a progress payment earned by the contractor but unpaid
at the time of default. The assignee bank prevailed since it had first
perfected its security interest by filing. The court apparently felt that,
under the Code, such a security interest could not be displaced on
any theory of subrogation. This seems to miss the whole point of sub-
rogation. The bank undoubtedly had priority as to the subject matter
of the assignment. That, however, was only the contractor's right to
the payment, and the surety, by subrogation, was asserting the own-
er's right to refuse to make the payment because of the contractor's
default." But it should be recognized that there has been a tendency
on the part of the courts to consider the surety's right of subrogation
in terms of priority. Thus in the leading Prairie State Bank case,il
the Supreme Court of the United States found that the surety's
equitable rights under the doctrine of subrogation came into existence
on the date of the contract and bond and thus had priority over the
bank's later assignment. The Pennsylvania court in the Hartford Ac-
cident case followed the same line of reasoning, but held for the as-
signee bank because, under the Code, its priority dated from the time
of filing the financing statement which was prior to the contract. 22
17 Supra note 8.
is Supra note 9.
19 Supra note 7.
zo This distinction finds support in the cases involving priority as to retained per-
centages between materialmen or sureties on the one hand and federal tax liens on the
other. The basic rule is that the question as to whether the taxpayer has a property
interest to which the tax lien can attach is to be determined by state law, while questions
of priority of lien are to be derided by federal law. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S.
509 (1960). The cases have generally held that, "under the applicable state law, the
defaulting contractor has no rights in the retained percentages to which the tax lien can
attach. The surety, on the other hand, can reach the retainage either by subrogation to
the owner or to the labor and material claims which it has paid. General Ins. Co. of
America v. Ted Price Constr. Co., 175 F. Supp. 261 (D. Idaho 1959) ; Wolverine Ins.
Co. v. Phillips, 165 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Iowa 1958). See also United States v. Chapman,
281 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1960). By way of contrast the tax lien prevailed when the surety
based its claim entirely on the assignment in the bond application. United States v.
Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
21 Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896).
22 See Goodwin, Significant Decisions Interpreting Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 18 Bus. Law. 777, 788 (1963) which interprets the Hartford Accident case
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In the writer's opinion, as previously indicated, subrogation does not
involve any such question of priority. Before leaving the Hartford
Accident case it should be pointed out that, since it involved a progress
payment rather than retained percentages, it was perhaps decided
correctly for reasons which will be discussed below.
In recent cases in Washington and Arkansas, the assignee banks
argued for priority on the basis of recently enacted accounts receiv-
able statutes.23 Both courts held that the perfection of the bank's
assignment against third parties under the statute did not in any way
alter or lessen the surety's rights by subrogation. Since the accounts
receivable statutes, which were enacted in the wake of Corn Exch.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder,' can be considered as the fore-
runners of the Code in this area, these cases would seem closely in
point."
In the case of progress payments earned but unpaid at the time
of default, the prior law is not so clear. Logically the surety's claim to
priority by subrogation to the owner seems strong. After default the
owner is not obligated to make any further payments to the con-
tractor until the construction has been completed and the owner's
damage claim thereby liquidated." Nor is there any reason for mak-
ing an exception to this for earned but unpaid progress payments,
since the contract obviously cannot be considered divisible merely
because of the provision for monthly payments." The surety, then,
regardless of whether it elects to complete performance or to respond
in damages, would seem equally entitled by subrogation to have
these amounts used in completing the construction. The shortcoming
of this analysis is that it ignores equitable considerations even though
subrogation is basically an equitable doctrine. In any event assignee
as denying subrogation because the surety had constructive notice of the bank's prior
claim from the filed financing statement. See also Goodwin, Selected Practical Con-
siderations Under Article 9, B.C. U.C.C. CO-ORD. 555, 559-62 (1963). Cf. Comment,
4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev; 748, 753 (1963) which interprets the case as holding that
the surety by filing a financing statement waived its claim by subrogation.
23 Levinson v. Linderrhan, 51 Wash. 2d 855, 322 P.2d 863 (1958); Exchange Bank
& Trust Co. v. Texarkana Sch. Dist., 227 Ark. 759, 301 S.W.2d 453 (1957). See also
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Castle, 196 Va. 686, 85 S.E.2d 228 (1955).
24 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
26 The Arkansas statute was of the so-called "validation" type while the Washington
statute requires the filing of a notice to perfect the assignment and is thus more analogous
to the Code. -
26 See Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. V. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 264
N.Y. 159, 190 N.E. 330 (1934). In this case the contract gave the owner the right to
use all unpaid amounts to complete the job in event of the contractor's default. O'Neil
Eng'r Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 222 S.W. 1091 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1920) reached '
the same result without - such express provisions.
27 Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Texarkana Sch. Dist., supra note 23; contra, -
First Nat'l Bank v. Monroe County, 131 Miss. 828, 95 So. 726 (1923).
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banks have frequently prevailed over sureties with respect to earned
but unpaid progress payments.
In some of these cases, the courts appear to have simply ignored
the possibility of subrogation and treated the question as one of
priority of assignment's But in a few, the courts have expressly
found subrogation to be unavailable for one reason or another. Thus
it has been held, with respect to public construction, that the surety's
only right to subrogation was to the labor and material claimants, and
therefore to the retained percentages.' Under the facts of one case,
the court found that the owner assumed a direct obligation to the
assignee bank and, therefore, had no rights with respect to the progress
payments in question to which the surety could be subrogated." In
another case the progress payment was not made when due because
of the owner's lack of funds, and for this reason the court apparently
felt that the rights of the assignee bank should not be affected by the
contractor's later default."
The greatest disagreement, in cases involving progress payments,
has been over the significance to be given to the fact that the bank's
advances have been used to pay expenses incurred in the particular
construction. Some courts have found this sufficient reason to hold
for the assignee bank," while others have stated that it is wholly
immaterial." A third group holds that this is relevant only if such
application is required by the contract between the bank and the
contractor." This disagreement is not surprising since it is difficult
to fit this factor into the logical pattern of subrogation. Clearly such
application of the assignee's advances would not impair the right of
the owner, as against the contractor's assignee, to use all unpaid
amounts to complete the project. If the surety's position by subroga-
tion is in all respects equivalent to that of the owner, then this factor
would likewise be immaterial so far as the surety is concerned. How-
ever, since subrogation is an equitable doctrine, it seems proper to
28 Coon River Co-op. Sand Ass'n v. McDougall Constr. Co., 215 Iowa 861, 244
N.W. 847 (1932).
2° North Pac. Bank v. Pierce County, 24 Wash. 2d 843, 167 P.2d 454 (1946);
First Nat'l Bank v. Monroe County, 131 Miss. 828, 95 So. 726 (1923).
3° Globe Indem. Co. v. West Texas Lumber Co., 34 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930).
31 Town of River Junction v. Maryland Cas. Co., 110 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1940).
32 Coconut Grove Exch. Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 149 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.
1945); Town of River Junction v. Maryland Cas. Co., 133 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1943);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 156 Me. 87, 161 A.2d 843
(1960).
33 Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra note.
26.
34 Seaboard Sur. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 121 F.2d 288 (8th Cir.
1941); American Employers Ins. Co. v. School Dist., 99 N.H. 188, 107 A.2d 684
(1954).
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take into account the fact that in these circumstances the bank's
advances have inured to the benefit of the surety who would other-
wise have been called upon to pay these claims."
On the subject of progress payments, special mention should also
be made of the cases involving federal construction, because of the
apparent significance of the Federal Assignment of Claims Act." In
its original version, this statute in effect nullified assignments of claims
against the government except when they were executed subsequent
to the issuance of a warrant or payment. In 1940 this was amended
to permit assignments to banks, trust companies and other financing
institutions.' The amendment included the following statement: "Not-
withstanding any law to the contrary governing the validity of as-
signments, any assignment pursuant to this section, shall constitute
a valid assignment for all purposes." The significance of this language
is obscure in cases where the surety is relying on subrogation. In two
cases before the Court of Claims involving retained percentages, the
surety has prevailed over an assignee bank that had perfected its as-
signment under the statute." On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has
relied heavily on this statute in two cases holding for assignee banks
as to unpaid progress payments."
It appears, then, that cases involving progress payments will
frequently arise in which, for any one of a variety of reasons, the
surety will not be able to prevail on any theory of subrogation and
must, therefore, rely upon the assignment in the bond application. In
. these cases the Code will undoubtedly have a substantial impact. In
considering the Code provisions, it will be helpful to examine con-
currently the case law on priority of assignment. This is considerably
more prolific than the foregoing discussion would indicate, because
in numerous instances the courts have chosen to comment on the
33 See Town of River Junction v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 31, in which
the court held that the assignee bank was subrogated, as against the surety, to the
labor and material claims paid by its loan, But see Johnson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 225
Ark. 224, 280 S.W.2d 398 (1955) stating that such subrogation is available only if the
loan was in some way induced by the surety. Cf. American Employers Ins. Co. v.
School Dist., supra note 34 in which the court, in holding for the surety, pointed out
that even though the surety in a sense had the benefit of the bank's advances it was
not unjustly enriched since it had been required to pay further claims.
" Rev. Stat. § 3477 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958).
37 54 Stat. 1029 (1940), 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958).
" National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 724, 133 F. Supp. 381 (1955);
Iladden v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 529, 132 F. Supp. 202 (1955).
39 General Cas. Co. v. Second Nat'l Bank, 178 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1949); Coconut
Grove Exch. Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., supra note 32. See also American Fid.
Co. v. National City Bank, 266 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The cases in this and the
preceding note are discussed in Comment, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 119 (1952). See also
Speidel, Federal Contract Funds: Surety v. Assignee, 47 Va. L. Rev. 640 (1961).
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question of priority even though the actual basis for decision has been
subrogation.
The assignment to the surety in the bond application is invariably
conditioned upon default. While there is some variation in language,
these provisions usually purport to assign only those amounts becom-
ing payable after default. Quite 'a number of courts have held that,
for purposes of priority, these assignments become effective only at the
date of default and generally are, therefore, junior to the assignments
to lending banks." On the other hand, at least as many courts have
held that the conditional feature is immaterial and have given the
surety's assignment priority from the date of the construction con-
tract.' A similar split of authority exists as to whether notice to the
owner is necessary for priority." These factors become completely
immaterial under the Code if one or both of the parties perfects his
assignment by filing a financing statement. Under the Code, priority
between conflicting security interests is determined by the order of
filing regardless of when the security interests actually attach."
Therefore, if the assignee bank files first, it will prevail even though
the interest of the surety is considered as attaching upon the execution
of the construction contract. The Hartford Accident case," previously
discussed, appears to be authority for this proposition even though
the court did not base its decision squarely on the "first-to-file" rule.'
Conversely, the surety will prevail if it files first, regardless of the fact
that its interest might be held to attach only upon the contractor's
default.
In the same connection, a further possibility deserves mention.
If a particular bank customarily finances all the jobs of a given con-
tractor, then it will no doubt have a financing statement in effect at
40 North Pac. Bank v. Pierce County, supra note 29; Coon River Co-op. Sand
Ass'n v. McDougall Constr. Co., supra note 28; Globe Indem. Co. v. West Texas Lum-
ber Co., supra note 30.
41 Gray v. Travelers Indem. Co., 280 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1960); O'Neil Eng'r Co.
v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 26.
42 First Nat'l Bank v. Monroe County, supra note 27 (notice necessary); Ameri-
can Employers Ins. Co. v. School Dist., supra note 34 (notice not necessary).
43 UCC 9-312(5).
44 Hartford Act. & Indem. Co. v. State Pub. School Bldg. Auth., 26 Pa. D. & C.2d
717 (1961).
45 The court relied on UCC § 9-312(3) of the 1952 draft of the Code which gives
priority to after-acquired collateral from the date of the originally perfected security
interest. The court considered the original security interest to date from the general
contract between the bank and the contractor for accounts receivable financing, al-
though it does not appear that any accounts were actually assigned thereby or any
advances made at that time. The court cited, but did not discuss UCC § 9-312(1)
• which stated the 1952 version of the "first-to-file" rule. In any event the matter is
considerably clarified in the 1958 draft both by a more explicit statement of the "first-
to-file" rule and by the removal of the after-acquired property provision from UCC
§ 9-312.
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all times which will serve to perfect all assignments made during the
effective period of the statement." Under such circumstances, no sur-
ety for a particular project could obtain priority of assignment regard-
less of how promptly it filed. A surety could, of course, have a fi-
nancing statement in effect at all times with respect to a particular
contractor but this does not seem so likely.
There is another type of case in which the surety must rely on
its assignment and in which, for different reasons, the Code will ap-
parently make considerable changes. Occasionally a surety has at-
tempted to recover amounts already paid to the assignee bank. For
the most part, these attempts have been unsuccessful. Subrogation
avails nothing in these cases since it has generally been held that the
owner himself cannot recover such payments from the assignee even
though, under the particular facts, the payment could have been re-
covered had it been made instead to the contractor.n Absent any
relevant statute the surety's position is not much better under its al-
legedly prior assignment. The general rule has been that a junior as-
signee who receives payment in good faith may retain the payment as
against a prior assignee." While the question is not covered expressly
by the Code, it seems clear that this last rule is changed. If the first
assignee has perfected his assignment by filing and has priority under
the provisions of the Code, then he will apparently be able to recover
amounts already collected by the junior assignee' In the type of case
46 UCC §i} 9-303, 9-403.
47 In United States v. Redden, 192 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1951), the court held that
the government could not recover amounts paid by mistake to a contractor's assignee,
relying principally upon Restatement, Restitution §§ 13, 14 (1937). This result is now
expressly provided for by an amendment to the Assignment of Claims Act, 65 Stat. 41
(1951), 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958). The Hadden case arose before the amendment and the
court held that it was merely declaratory of the prior law. In subsequent cases, the
courts have relied on the amendment to deny the surety recovery, on the theory of
subrogation, of amounts already paid to the assignee bank. American Fid. Co. v.
National City Bank, supra note 39; Bank of Arizona v. National Sur. Corp., 237
F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1956). An earlier federal case reached the same result. California
Bank v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 129 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1942). See also Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Harvard Trust Co., 344 Mass. 160, 181 N.E.2d 673 (1962).
48 Restatement, Contracts § 173 (1932). This rule was apparently followed in the
federal cases cited in the preceding note since the courts, in considering the question
of priority of assignment, emphasized that the assignee banks had no notice of the
assignment to the surety in the bond application. In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Harvard
Trust Co., supra note 47, the court cited § 173 and related Massachusetts' cases. In
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bank of Brewton, 4 F. Supp. 272 (S.D. Ala. 1933),
the court found the bank had notice because it knew of unpaid bills. The surety re-
covered the payments from the bank apparently on the ground of subrogation to the
materialmen.
49
 This seems to follow from UCC § 9-312 which makes priority between con-
flicting security interests depend upon the order of filing or perfection. UCC § 9-318(3)
authorizes payment by the account debtor to the assignor until notice of the assignment,
but this does not seem relevant to the rights of a junior assignee receiving payments.
In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 156 Me. 87, 161 A.2d 843
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under consideration, this means that if the surety files first, the as-
signee bank may not even be able to keep amounts already collected.
This is probably not quite so serious as it first appears since the
surety's assignment, by its terms, will usually reach only amounts be-
coming payable after default.
In a number of cases, the surety has sought to recover payments
becoming due on one contract to reimburse itself for losses sustained
on another bond for the same contractor. Since the assignment in the
bond application is invariably conditioned on default, this possibility
is available only if there has been a default on the contract giving rise
to the payments, and the surety has been able to complete it for less
than the amount remaining unpaid at the time of default. The terms
of the assignment are generally broad enough to cover losses on other
bonds and the courts have given them effect, in the circumstances out-
lined, as against assignee banks?' Under the Code, the rules governing
priority of assignment, as discussed above, will apply to these cases,
but otherwise the Code will apparently make no changes in this area.
From the foregoing discussion it seems evident that, not only
has the prior case law in this area been largely unsatisfactory, but also
that the enactment of the Code, rather than improving the situation,
has added to the uncertainty. When the draftsmen eliminated the 1952
provision favoring assignees they apparently intended that the Code
should thereafter be neutral in these disputes between assignee banks
and sureties.' However, the Pennsylvania experience indicates that
the Code will definitely be a factor in these cases although its impact
is presently unpredictable. The difficulty with the Code in this area
is that, while it clearly governs the relative rights of the parties as
assignees, it leaves the rights of the surety by subrogation in a state
of uncertainty. Lawyers and judges will be reluctant to recognize that
the Code provides only partial coverage of what is, after all, a single
question. The Hartford Accident case" is significant principally as
an illustration of the difficulties and confusion which will result.
Additional statutory coverage is apparently indicated, not only
to clear up the confusion which has resulted from the Code, but also
to replace the arbitrary and frequently conflicting rules of the prior
case law. While there are presently a number of statutes on the books
(1960), the Maine court allowed the surety to recover progress payments already received
by the assignee bank on the basis of Maine's "validation" type accounts receivable statute,
which expressly provides that a junior assignee receiving payment "shall be a trustee
and shall be accountable . . . to the original assignee therefore."
56 Gray v. Travelers Indem. Co., supra note 41; In re Allied Prods. Co., 134
F.2d 725 (6th Or. 1943); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Harvard Trust Co., supra note
47; Seligmann v. Hill & Combs, 338 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
51 Supra notes 8 and 9.
52 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. State Pub. Sch. Bldg. Auth., supra note 44.
256
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT FINANCING
of various jurisdictions which touch on the problem, none of these
seems to provide a satisfactory solution. For example, the various
amendments to the Federal Assignment of Claims Act have obviously
been intended to facilitate financing on government contracts and to
strengthen the position of assignee banks. While it is by no means
clear that Congress intended to enhance thereby the position of as-
signees as against sureties, this has apparently been the result.
New York has a rather complex statutory scheme, as a part of
its mechanics lien law, to insure that amounts received by contractors
under building contracts are used to discharge obligations incurred
in the performance of the contract, and these provisions are made ap-
plicable to amounts advanced on assignments of such contracts."
However, the assignee will prevail over subsequent labor and material
claims, including those of subcontractors, only to the extent that its
advances are actually used in the project and then only if a proper
"notice of lending" has been filed." The California provisions, which
are also included in the mechanics lien law and which are equally
complex, give labor and material claimants a prior right to all amounts
becoming payable under the contract over the contractor's assignee
regardless of whether the latter's advances have been used in the
project." Both of these statutes illustrate a strong tendency to give
labor and material suppliers a preferred position with respect to
contract funds. However, neither makes any special provisions for
sureties, and they must therefore come into the picture as subrogees of
labor and material claimants. In a sense this is unrealistic since, at least
in public construction, the laborers and materialmen are always amply
protected by the payment bond, and the dispute, when it occurs, will
generally involve the assignee bank and the surety. Whether the posi-
tion of the surety, a professional risk taker, should be fully equated to
that of labor and material claimants is open to question.
The 1952 provision of the Code at least attempted to deal ex-
pressly with the relative rights of sureties and assignee banks. How-
ever, its subsequent eliminations would indicate that the solution it
provided was not an acceptable one. That provision, it will be recalled,
gave the assignee priority over the surety as to all amounts payable
under the contract so long as the assignee's advances were made for
use in the performance of the contract. This seems objectionable
primarily because it fails to distinguish between retained percentages
and progress payments.
Retained percentages are a species of security and for this reason
sa N.Y. Lien Law §§ 70-79,
54 N.Y. Lien Law § 73.
55 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1192.1.
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the surety's claim to them by subrogation is intrinsically strong. Be-
yond that there would seem to be very few situations in which the use
of retained percentages for collateral would serve any legitimate fi-'
nancial need of the contractor. Since the contractor will ordinarily pay
subcontractors and material suppliers on the same basis on which he
is being paid by the owner," it should ordinarily not be necessary for
him to assign the retained percentages to secure a working capital
advance for the particular job. Moreover, the subcontracts will usually
have provisions for retained percentages similar to the prime or general.
contract. If the general contractor assigns his retained percentages
and uses the proceeds of the loan for other projects or purposes; he'
is likely to be without funds to pay the subcontractors their retained
percentages when the time comes. Finally, since the contractor is in
effect anticipating future profits when he assigns the retained per-
centages, such an assignment would seem to defeat the purpose of the
retainage from the point of view of the owner. It will no longer pro-
vide an inducement to the contractor to complete performance." It
would appear therefore that, for a variety of reasons, the case law
is correct in generally giving the sureties priority over assignee banks.
as to retained percentages.
On the other hand, financing on the assignment of specific progress
payments seems to be a reasonable method for meeting the •working
capital needs of contractors. Such financing does 'not impair any
legitimate interest of the surety since, at the time of assuming its obli-
gation, the surety cannot very well count on the possibility of an
earned but unpaid progress payment at the time of default. Further-
more, sureties must frequently rely on the availability of such financing,
since without it the contractors would be unable to undertake the con-
struction at all. It has been suggested that the proper solution to the
difficulties in this area is a prior agreement under which the surety could
subordinate its claim if it decides that the financing is desirable in the
particular circumstances." However, such agreements are apparently
quite rare, probably because a surety company is an extremely difficult
66 See American Institute of Architects, The General Conditions of the Contract
for the Construction of Buildings, A.I.A. Document No. A-201, Article 37 (1961).
67 In this connection UCC § 9-318 should be noted. This section invalidates any
provision of a contract prohibiting assignment. In the case of construction contracts
this seems unfair to the owner. Under the prior law the owner, when requested to con-
sent to an assignment, has been able to consider its probable effect under the particular
circumstances, on future performance. In spite of a valid provision prohibiting assign-
ment a sort of "non-notification" financing was apparently possible if the bank cared
to risk it. See McLaughlin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. —Mass. —, 188 N.E.2d
552 (1963).
iss This was the suggestion of the Association of Casualty and Surety Companies
in opposing the 1952 provision, see note 9, supra.
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entity with which to communicate during the interval between the
writing of the bond and the default."
In the writer's opinion, a statute based on the distinction between
retained percentages and progress payments would give fair recogni-
tion to the reasonable expectations of both sureties and lenders and
would be much better, both in terms of certainty and of policy, than
either the incomplete coverage of the Code or the prior case law. Most
of the cases have involved public contracts, and it should be relatively
easy to draft such a statute for public construction, since the terms of
both the contracts and bonds are themselves established in large part
by statute. There might be some practical difficulties in drafting such a
statute so as to make it applicable to contracts for private construction,
even though, in practice, the payment provisions and the bonds are
generally similar to those used in public contracts. In view of the
local interests involved with respect to public construction, and also
in view of the unfortunate experience with the 1952 provision, it may
not be feasible to attempt such a statutory solution by amendment of
the Code. In that case it would be better to completely supersede the
Code in this area.
59 The principal difficulty is illustrated by Seaboard Sur. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 121 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1941), in which the bank relied on a consent
to the assignment executed by a representative of a general agency of the surety who
signed as "Attorney-in-fact." The principal purpose of the power of attorney naming
such agents is, of course, to authorize them to execute bonds, and in this case the
surety company contended that the agent had no authority to execute the consent.
The court held otherWise on a somewhat doubtful interpretation of the power of at-
torney. Nonetheless, the decision appeals to the writer because, in his limited experience,
any inquiry or request of this sort which is addressed to the home office of a surety
company will be referred back to• a general agent for handling.
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